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                                                                By Kazuo Ueda 
 
This paper discusses the backgrounds for the stagnant behavior of the Japanese 
economy during the last two decades and the failure of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to turn 
the economy around. I argue that the policy authorities did not act quickly enough to 
mitigate the pain of the deleveraging process in the aftermath of the burst of land and 
stock price bubble in  the early 1990s. Thus, the process  became overly  severe and 
protracted. The economy increasingly became vulnerable to negative external shocks 
and the decline in its population. Use of non-conventional monetary policy measures 
after deflationary expectations became entrenched substantially weakened their power 
to stimulate the economy. The U.S. economy since 2007 has exhibited many of the 
features seen for the Japanese economy during the last two decades; hence, the talk of 
the Japanization of the U.S. economy. There are, however, many dissimilarities as well 
as  similarities  between  the  two  episodes.  These  are  also  discussed  along  with  the 
analysis of Japan’s two lost decades.   
Popular  discussions  of  Japan’s  stagnation  often  focus  on  persistent  deflation. 
Figure 1 shows core CPI inflation and a representative property price index for Japan 
and the U.S. since the peak of property prices, with the peak (T=0) assumed to be 1990 
for Japan and 2006 for the U.S. In addition, it also plots investment in structures relative 
to GDP in Japan.   
Inflation in Japan has been in negative territory since 1998.
1  There has been, 
however, no tendency for the deflation to accelerate. The cumulative decrease in the 
index since the late 1990s has been only about 5%. Thus, the classic debt-deflation type 
dynamic has not been  a major cause of economic stagnation.  In contrast, declines in 
property prices in Japan since the peak has been large and protracted —cumulating in a 
60% decline at the time of writing. They led to significant deleveraging by financial 
institutions and non-financial corporations, which put downward pressure on aggregate 
demand for goods and services, especially, investment in structures, the component of 
aggregate  demand  most  sensitive  to  property  prices.  The  figure  shows  that  its 
                                                   
1  Japan’s CPI has been adjusted to purge the effects of the consumption tax rate hikes 
in 1989 and 1997.   2 
 
movements have been highly correlated with those of property prices.
2  As may be seen 
from the figure, this component of aggregate demand alone subtracted about 0.4% per 
year from GDP growth during the 1990s.  Such a negative feedback loop among asset 
prices, economic activity and, as we discuss below, financial instability has been the key 
feature of Japan’s stagnation. It is also interesting to note that both CPI inflation and 
property prices in the U.S. since the recent financial crisis have followed closely that of 
Japan in the 1990s, but inflation has so far avoided plunging into negative territory. 
     Adjustment in asset prices and real investment were to some extent inevitable 
given the extent of the excesses created during the bubble period. The deleveraging 
process, however, became extremely protracted as a result of a forbearance game played 
by policymakers and financial institutions. Banks kept lending for a while to zombie 
companies  in  order  to  avoid  recognition  of  losses  on  their  balance  sheets,  and  the 
authority  stayed  away  for  years  from  making  the  tough  decision  to  recapitalize  the 
banks. This resulted in a huge buildup of bad loans and eventually in a serious credit 
crunch in the late 1990s, which aggravated the declines in asset prices and deleveraging 
by banks  and nonfinancial corporations.  Banks  increasingly became risk averse and 
stopped lending to risky, but promising projects. The economy slowly, but steadily lost 
momentum  and  could  not  grow  out  of  the  negative  shocks  generated  by  external 
financial crises  in  the late 1990s  and 2000s,  and the declines  in  its  population  that 
started in the 2000s. 
    Deflation of the general price level did play a part in this process as well. It has 
hindered the effectiveness of monetary easing. This is ironic because monetary policy 
normally is a tool for avoiding deflation. Either the deleveraging forces outweighed the 
capacity of monetary policy to stimulate the economy or the BOJ easing came a bit too 
late. The BOJ tried to reverse the disinflation trend with fairly aggressive rate cuts—a 
conventional monetary policy tool-- and brought the policy rate to near zero by late 
1995,  effectively  hitting  the  zero  lower  bound  (ZLB)  constraint  on  interest  rates. 
Deflation, however, developed in response to economic weakness. The real interest rate 
has stayed at higher levels than desirable, and undermined the power of a zero interest 
rate to stimulate the economy, although it did not throw the economy into a deflationary 
spiral.  Since  the  late  1990s,  the  BOJ  has  adopted  a  variety  of  non-conventional 
                                                   
2  Investment in structures in the figure includes that by the government. There is no 
good data to separate this component out. Assuming, however, that all investment by 
the general government is investment in structures, an estimate of investment in 
structures by private firms is obtained. It shows a similar, but slightly larger decline 
during the 1990s, while it hits a bottom in the early 2000s and increases marginally 
toward the late 2000s. This is due to the government’s policy to reduce public 
investment in the 2000s.   3 
 
monetary policy measures. They have supported the financial system and prevented 
deflation from becoming worse, but have not turned the economy around. As I argue 
below,  non-conventional  measures  work  by  reducing  risk  premiums  and  long-short 
interest rate spreads. The long period of economic stagnation had lowered these spreads 
to minimum levels and limited the effectiveness of such measures as was the case for 
conventional measures. 
     In the following I will describe in more detail the deleveraging experience in 
Japan and then turn to discussing the experience of the BOJ to turn the economy around. 
Comparisons  with  the  U.S.  experience  since  2007  are  offered  at  each  stage  of  the 
discussion. 
 
1, Deleveraging in Japan during the Last Two Decades 
 
Declines in Economic Growth and Productivity 
Figure 2 presents the average growth rate of per capita real GDP and population, 
thus, also of aggregate real GDP, for Japan and the U.S. during three sub-periods since 
the early 1970s. Japan’s aggregate growth rate declined sharply during the 1990s and 
2000s. Regarding this, let us first note the sharp decline in the growth rate of labor 
productivity, that is, the growth rate of per capita real GDP during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Productivity in the 1990s and 2000s grew at a speed of less than one third of that in the 
1974-1990 period. Secondly, population growth also declined sharply in the 1990s and 
came to a halt in the 2000s, also contributing to the decrease in the growth of aggregate 
real GDP. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) are among those who point out that declines in 
total factor productivity growth was the major cause of Japan’s economic stagnation in 
the 1990s. In their work, however, the reason for the decline in productivity growth is 
not analyzed.   
It is interesting to note that the difference in aggregate GDP growth rates between 
Japan and the U.S. in the 2000s came almost entirely from that in population growth 
rates. Put differently, the 2000s may have been a lost decade for the U.S. as well. It saw 
a fairly serious recession in the early 2000s and the so-called great recession in the late 
2000s. It is quite possible that the weakness of the U.S. economy was a factor behind 
that of the Japanese economy during the period. 
 
Asset Price Declines, Deleveraging and Forbearance Policy 
As argued above, it is the declines in asset prices rather than consumer prices that 
have generated serious negative effects on the  Japanese economy. Figure 3 presents   4 
 
estimates of the market value based leverage ratio for financials and non-financials.
3 
For both sectors, the ratio declined through the 1980s as stock and land prices increased. 
The movement was reversed in the 1990s in response to the collapse in asset prices and, 
in the banks’ case, to increased bad loan write-offs.
4  The increases in leverage during 
this period were, of course, unintentional; players in both sectors were attempting  to 
deleverage, but were overwhelmed by further declines in asset prices. Banks sold stocks 
in net terms in large amounts in late 1990 toward early 1991 and then again for a 
prolonged period between 1996 and 2006. Non-financials were net sellers of land in the 
mid to late 1990s.
5  Such sales obviously added to the declines in asset prices and made 
the deleveraging process severe—a process observed again during 2007-09 in the U.S. 
concerning many financial instruments.  The resulting  sharp increase in leverage  for 
financials, in particular, meant a corresponding decline in capital ratios and constrained 
their  risk  taking  behavior  severely.  Here,  we  already  see  a  negative  loop  between 
financial stability and asset prices. Leverage finally started to decrease in the late 1990s 
for non-financials and in the early 2000s for financials. It had been an amazingly long 
deleveraging process. 
Despite the immediate effect on their balance sheets of the fall in stock prices and 
their  prospective  deterioration  through  loans  to  property  related  sectors,  banks’ 
responses were limited in the early 1990s. Figure 4 shows bank loan growth rates before 
and after the collapse in asset prices and the amount of bad loan disposals by Japan’s 
large  banks.  The  recent  behavior  of  U.S.  bank  lending  is  also  shown.
6  Bank loan 
growth in Japan fell sharply in the early 1990s, but stayed in positive territory until the 
late 1990s. In fact, banks were still supporting zombie companies by rolling over loans. 
Banks became earnest in bad loan disposal in year 1995 (=year T+5) onwards. By this 
time bad loans probably had become much larger than would have been the case had 
they been addressed in the early 1990s.  The U.S. bank loan growth rate has followed 
Japan’s pattern quite closely so far in a similar way to the movement in property prices, 
which is suggestive of severe deleveraging taking place in the real sector. 
Why was the response of Japanese banks so slow? The introduction of the BIS 
                                                   
3  The data are from Japan’s National Income Accounts. Unfortunately, financials 
include broker-dealers, insurance companies and pension funds, in addition to deposit 
taking banks. 
4  Both banks and non-financial firms have held large amounts of equities. 
Non-financial firms also have held real estate, while banks’ exposure to real estate has 
been mainly through real estate related lendings. 
5  See Figure A1 in the online Appendix. 
6  In this chart the peak of asset prices in the U.S. is assumed to be 2007, the year the 
stock prices peaked.   5 
 
capital ratio regulation and the erosion of capital as a result of the sharp fall in stock 
prices had certainly made it difficult for banks to recognize and dispose of bad loans in 
large amounts.
7  It is, however, more appropriate to regard this as a forbearance game 
played by banks and the government. An early attempt at the resolution of the bad loan 
problem reportedly came in the summer of 1992, when the then prime minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa discussed the possibility of bank recapitalization  with bank CEOs, but was 
rejected by the latter.
8  Thus, the government was not able to force banks to address the 
bad loan problem quickly. It used public money for the resolution of nonbanks called 
Jusen in 1995. It was, however, not until  the late 1990s  that the government finally 
decided  to  inject  capital  into  banks .  Persuading  the  p ublic  of  the  need  for 
recapitalization required the financial crisis of 1997-98.   
 
 
Financial Crisis of 1997-98 and the Negative Feedback Loop among Asset Prices, 
Financial Stability and Growth   
The forbearance approach cost the economy dearly. The East Asian economic 
crisis and the consumption tax rate hike in 1997 became a trigger for a serious financial 
crisis in 1997-98. A medium sized securities company, Sanyo Securities, went under in 
November 1977 and defaulted on call market loans for the first time in the post war 
period. A panic ensued in the financial system and led to a series of bank/ securities 
company  bankruptcies.  This  was  Japan’s  “Lehman”  moment.  Figure  5  presents  the 
behavior  of  the  money  market  risk  premium  in  Japan  (3  month  Bank  Negotiable 
Certificate of Deposit rate minus 3 month Treasury bill rate) and in the U.S. (3 month 
LIBOR  over 3 month Treasury bill  rate)  after the bubble burst.
9  The risk premium 
increased  sharply right after property and stock prices started to fall in the U.S. In 
contrast, it was not until late 1997/early 1998 that the premium rose sharply in Japan. 
Despite the buildup of bad loans, banks had still been lending to each other and to 
non-financial firms, as shown in Figure 4, until sometime in 1997.  The government 
finally decided to inject capital into banks in the spring of 1998 and again in early 1999. 
The capital injection speeded up the pace of bad loan disposal, as shown in Figure 4. 
                                                   
7  Another reason for slow bad loan disposal was opposition to speedy disposal by the tax 
authority. Until 1997, when own assessment of bad loans by banks was introduced, 
banks had to go through tough negotiations with the tax authority regarding their 
treatment of bad loans. This was because bad loan disposal immediately or eventually 
generated consequences for tax revenues. See, for example, Nishikawa (2011) pp. 
148-49. 
8  Nishikawa (2011), pp. 137-38. 
9  In the figure T+0 is set to equal June 2007 for the U.S. and January 1990 for Japan.   6 
 
After the crisis banks intensified their effort at deleveraging. Bank loan growth 
became negative and did not come back to positive territory until the mid-2000s (Figure 
4). Many researchers have found significant negative effects of the deterioration of bank 
balance  sheets  on  business  fixed  investment.
10  It  may  be  seen  in  Figure  1  that 
investment in structures stopped declining briefly  around 1997 -98, but r esumed  a 
downtrend after that. N on-financial corporations increased savings  to repay existing 
debt, which is the mirror image of the negative bank lending growth shown in Figure 3. 
Such efforts also intensified after 1998.
11 
The picture that emerges from all this is one of negative feedbacks among  asset 
prices, financial stability and economic  growth. The negative feedback became more 
serious  after  the  credit  crunch  of  1997 -98.  The  long-term  interest  rate  declined 
significantly during 1996-98 in the absence of any significant movements in the policy 
rate, as shown in Figure 6 below. Most likely, events during these years led to declines 
in growth and inflation expectations. In fact, various economic surveys point to declines 
in growth  expectations in the late 1990s.
12  The decline in long -term interest rates 
during this period was larger than that of expected growth as indicated in such surveys, 
implying that inflation expectations fell as well.
13  Moreover, when property prices are 
deflated by GDP, the variable  had gone back to pre-bubble levels by the mid- to late 
1990s,  but  c ontinued  to  decline  there after,  confirming  the  possibility  of  negative 
interaction between growth and asset prices.
14  All this had prolonged the deleveraging 
process, as was seen in Figure 3. 
In passing, we may note that a reason for the forbearance approach can be found in 
Figure 5, that is, the absence of a serious financial panic until late 1997. In contrast, in 
the  recent  U.S.  case  the  financial  system  exhibited  serious  instability  almost 
immediately after the collapse of the property and credit market bubble. The difference 
                                                   
10  See Sekine (1999) and Kasahara, Sawada and Suzuki (2011). 
11  See Figure A1 in the on-line Appendix. The literature has not reached consensus as to 
whether the declines in bank loans were a demand side or supply side phenomenon. Koo 
(2009) emphasizes the importance of the demand side. Here, let me provisionally 
assume that both sides played roles. 
12 See Figure A3. 
13  See Figure A2 where expected inflation is calculated by implied forward rates from 
the SWAP curve and growth expectations compiled by the Cabinet Office appearing in 
Figure A3. Although Figure A2 suggests that medium to long-term inflation 
expectations fell in advance of deflation, it does not seem to support the Benhabib et al 
(2001) story that an exogenous emergence of deflationary expectations was a cause of a 
zero interest rate and deflation. Inflation expectations in the figure are mostly positive 
and their declines in 1996-98, as argued in the text, seem to have been a result of 
developments in the economy. 
14  See Figure A3.   7 
 
was due to that of the structure of the financial system. Table 1 compares the financial 
structure of the Euro Area, Japan and the U.S. The U.S. is clearly an outlier with a large 
weight of the “others” component, which is mostly market oriented financial institutions. 
In a market oriented financial system, stresses spread across the system swiftly and the 
financial authorities are obliged to respond. This seems to be the major reason for the 
differences in the speed of authorities’ response to the financial crisis between the three 
areas.  Of course, other  factors played roles  as  well. The U.S.  authorities  may have 
learned from Japan’s mistake and/or had more accurate recognition of the state of the 
financial system and the economy. For example, the BOJ’s official economic report did 
not recognize the negative interaction between financial factors and the real economy 
until the fourth quarter of 1993.
15   
 
Financial Factors and Declines in Productivity 
The  literature  on  Japan’s  stagnation  has  pointed  out  another  aspect  of  negative 
interaction between financial stability and the economy.    Using firm-level data, Fukao 
and Kwon (2006) present a striking result that the productivity level of exiting firms 
was higher than that of staying firms in many industries during 1994-2001. Nishimura, 
Nakajima  and  Kiyota  (2005)  show  similar  results,  but  also  point  out  that  such  a 
tendency was more salient during years of Japan’s banking crisis, that is, the late 1990s. 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) go further by showing that Japanese banks allocated credit 
to severely impaired borrowers in an attempt to avoid the realization of losses on their 
own  balance  sheets—another  manifestation  of  the  forbearance  attitude.  Such  works 
point to the distinct possibility that impaired bank balance sheets lowered the efficiency 
of financial intermediation and led to declines in economic growth. They also provide a 
bridge between the literature emphasizing reduced productivity growth and the works 
that focuse on financial factors.
16 
                                                   
15  One thing the U.S. authorities may not have learnt from the Japanese experience is 
systemic risk implications of a bankruptcy of investment banks. In Japan’s case the 
failure of securities companies led to a systemic crisis. Something similar could have 
been foreseen of the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
16  Some authors, including Ogawa and Suzuki (1998), analyze the role played by the 
use of land as a device to alleviate information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. They show that firms increasingly relied on the use of land as collateral in 
the 1980s as land prices soared, which was one of the reasons for the sharp rise in 
business fixed investment during the period. Conversely, the decline in land prices since 
the  early  1990s  exerted  strong   negative  effects  on  investment  through  this 
route—providing yet another channel of negative interaction between asset prices and   8 
 
     Thus,  the  economy  has  increasingly  lost  dynamism  and  expectations  of  low 
growth  and  deflation  have  become  entrenched.  As  a  result,  the  financial  crises 
originating  in  foreign  economies  since  the  late  1990s  have  adversely  affected  the 
economy perhaps more seriously than other economies. The expectation of declines in 
population  has  affected  housing  and  business  fixed  investment  negatively.  In  this 
environment  the  BOJ’s  attempts  to  stimulate the economy  have not  had much of  a 
success at least so far. I now turn to this topic in the next section. 
 
2, Addressing Financial Instability and Deflation: The BOJ’s Experience 
 
Use of Conventional Monetary Policy   
In  the  following  I  first  review  the  BOJ’s  experience  with  the  use  of  the 
conventional  policy tool, the overnight  rate, and then move on to  discuss  the more 
recent experience with non-conventional monetary policy measures. Figure 6 presents 
the movements in the overnight rate in Japan and the U.S. along with the 10 year JGB 
yield. The overnight rates in nominal terms as well as the real rates calculated using 
ex-post core CPI inflation are shown. The horizontal axis is the time elapsed after the 
start of the collapse of the stock market bubble.   
     First, it is noteworthy that the BOJ was still raising rates even after stock prices 
started to decline sharply; the last rate hike came on August 30, 1990, when Nikkei 225 
was already 33% below its peak.
  17  Clearly, the BOJ was not concerned much with 
possible negative consequences of a sharp fall in asset prices for the financial system 
and the economy at this point. 
     The BOJ started to lower the policy rate in 1991. By the second half of 1995 the 
rate had been brought down to less than 0.5%. Even these 800 basis point cuts in the 
overnight rate did not turn the economy around. The behavior of the real policy rate 
suggests that the BOJ was cutting the nominal rate faster than the speed with which 
inflation fell, providing stimulus to the economy.
18  The decline in the real rate, however, 
came to a halt and started to move upward in the late 1990s as the deflationary trend set 
in. We see here clearly the severe constraint the ZLB placed on monetary policy. Since 
then, the nominal policy rate has been in the [0%, 0.5%] range for more than a decade 
                                                                                                                                                     
the real economy. 
17  More precisely, the call market rate became the policy rate in 1995, while before that 
the official discount rate was the rate that was regarded as representing the stance of 
monetary policy. August 30, 1990 is the date when the discount rate was raised. 
18  Otherwise, the real interest rate would rise and exert negative effects on the 
economy.   9 
 
and a half. 
     The behavior of the nominal and real federal funds rate in the same figure shows 
that the Fed has reacted to the current financial crisis much more rapidly than did the 
BOJ in the 1990s. The policy rate was brought down to near zero within one and a half 
years of the start of the crisis. Given that inflation is still positive, the real rate has been 
sharply negative. In contrast, the real policy rate was never below -0.5% in Japan in the 
1990s. This is surely one of the reasons why the U.S. has avoided deflation so far.   
     What if the BOJ had embarked on a much more aggressive rate cut in the early 
1990s bringing the real rate down to around -2% by 1992 or 1993? It would have surely 
stimulated the economy significantly more than the actual policy adopted at that time 
and possibly weakened the tendency for the yen to appreciate toward the mid 1990s, 
although  the  precise  magnitude  of  such  effects  is  difficult  to  estimate.  In  reality, 
however, policymakers’ goal at that time seems to have been avoiding the resurgence of 
asset price bubble. There was no immediate stress felt in the financial system except the 
declines in land and stock prices—which were a “good” thing. In contrast, the financial 
crisis of 2007-08 was an important factor behind the Fed’s aggressive rate cuts. Such a 
discussion raises the important question of  the role financial stability considerations 
should play in the determination of the policy rate. I do not have space to get into that, 
and  confine  myself  to  pointing  out  the  literature  that  gives  an  important  role  for 
financial stability.
19 
     In  concluding  the  discussion  of   conventional  monetary  policy,  it  would  be 
appropriate to consider the reason for the failure of near zero policy rates to stimulate 
the economy adequately. First, due to deflation, the real policy rate has been positive, 
roughly in the zero to one and a half percent range since the mid-1990s, although it has 
not become sharply positive. Second, deleveraging forces as discussed in the previous 
section have undermined the  stimulus provided by  such low rates. Banks have been 
tightening credit standards in making loans. Non-financial corporations have either been 
forced by banks or tried hard themselves to repay debt. Given expectations of declines 
in future property prices, not too many have borrowed money and bought properties. 
Third, as the period of low interest rates has become protracted, the incentive to move 
forward future investment to take advantage of low interest rates has diminished. Thus, 
the interest rate elas ticity of spending  has  declined, lowering the effectiveness of 
monetary easing.   
 
Use of Non-conventional Monetary Policy Measures 
                                                   
19  See, for example, Curdia & Woodford (2010).   10 
 
     Given  the  ZLB  and  the  persistent  deflation,  the  BOJ  has  adopted  many 
non-conventional monetary policy measures since the late 1990s. The review of the 
measures is interesting in itself, but is also important in the light of similar measures 
adopted by other central banks in developed economies since 2007. In the following I 
first  offer  a  conceptual  typology  of  the  measures  and  then  a  discussion  of  the 
effectiveness of the measures.
20 
Monetary easing measures that can be adopted near the ZLB may be classified as 
follows: (A) forward guidance—providing assurance to the market that the policy rate 
will be lower in the future than currently expected; (B) changing the composition of the 
central  bank’s  balance  sheet  so  as  to  increase  the  central  bank’s  holdings  of 
non-traditional  assets  (targeted  asset  purchases);  and  (C)  expanding  the  size  of  the 
central  bank’s  balance  sheet  beyond  the  level  required  for  a  zero  policy  rate 
(Quantitative Easing: QE). 
In order to affect market expectations of future short rates under strategy A, the 
central bank needs to commit to monetary easing even after the economy no longer 
requires it. Then, the current market rates will be lowered up to a certain maturity, but 
raised  beyond  that  maturity  because  unnecessary  easing  in  the  future  creates  an 
expectation of rising inflation. As such, however, the central bank has an incentive to 
renege on the commitment ex post—one of the weaknesses of the strategy.   
Strategy B may be further decomposed into two types: one, purchases of assets in 
distressed  markets,  and,  the  other,  those  in  more  normal  markets.  The  first  has 
sometimes  been  called  credit  easing  and  is  aimed  at  containment  of  liquidity/risk 
premiums in markets under stress. Allen and Gale (2007) and Curdia and Woodford 
(2010) show that credit easing can be effective when there is a market failure in credit 
markets. Even targeted asset purchases in more normal markets seem to require some 
market imperfections such as investors’ segmentation across maturities in government 
bond markets.   
Many central banks, in their recent pursuit of strategy (B) since 2007, have not 
mopped up the funds supplied, thus giving the appearance that they have been pursuing 
QE.
21  Thus, the distinction between the two strategies is a subtle one. In the following 
let us take QE to be the strategy to pursue expansion of the size of central bank balance 
sheet no matter what it buys, while with targeted asset purchases the focus is on what 
the central bank buys.
22  Unfortunately, it is not easy to find  theoretical justification of 
                                                   
20  For more detail on these see Ueda (2012). 
21  One exception has been the September 2011 Fed decision to buy long-term, and sell 
an equal amount of short-term Treasury bonds—an operations twist.   
22  An alternative definition of QE is expansion of central bank balance sheet by   11 
 
QE beyond that for forward guidance or targeted asset purchases. A simple reason for 
this is the following: if the economy is at the ZLB, it is satiated with liquidity. Hence, 
attempts to add liquidity further do not seem to produce significant results.     
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  many  of  the  non-conventional  measures  work  by 
lowering interest rate spreads and/or risk premiums. This is clear with forward guidance, 
which is an attempt to narrow long-short interest rate spreads up to a certain maturity, 
although  it  may  widen  the  spreads  beyond  that  maturity  if  it  succeeds  in  raising 
inflation/growth  expectations.  Credit  easing  is,  by  definition,  an  attempt  to  reduce 
risk/liquidity premiums in markets that are temporarily dysfunctional. Asset purchases 
in more normal markets also is an attempt at lowering the risk premium of the asset 
bought with hopefully spillover effects on other assets through portfolio rebalancing. 
Such  a  consideration  suggests  that  there  are  limits  to  how  far  non-conventional 
monetary policy measures can be used. Risk premiums cannot go below zero. Even at 
positive levels, if they fall below certain levels by a central bank move, the central bank 
is required to carry out large amounts of financial intermediation involving the asset in 
question.  If  prolonged,  there  will  be  a  serious  loss  of  efficiency  of  intermediation. 
Admittedly, these lower limits are not as well defined as in the case of the ZLB on the 
policy interest rate. It still seems appropriate to argue for the existence of loose lower 
bounds below which risk premiums cannot fall--Lower Bounds on spreads.
23  As we see 
below, the BOJ, with its extensive use of non -conventional measures, seems close to 
hitting these lower bounds.   
 
The BOJ: 1999-2011 
The  BOJ  has  employed  non-conventional  measures  in  three  waves.  First,  the 
so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) was introduced in April 1999. The ZIRP was 
not just a zero policy rate, but a commitment to maintain it “until deflationary concerns 
were dispelled”, and thus was a major example of forward guidance.
24  In August 2000, 
the BOJ lifted the ZIRP and raised the overnight call market rate to 0.25 %. 
The second wave came in the aftermath of the collapse of the IT bubble in 2001 . 
The BOJ adopted the quantitative easing policy--let us call it QEJ, Japan's version of 
QE--in March 2001. QEJ contained all three components of non-conventional monetary 
policy. There was QE, that is, the shift of the operational target of policy from the call 
                                                                                                                                                     
purchases of traditional asset, say, treasury bills. See Ueda (2012). 
23  In the case of long-short interest rate spreads, these can become negative in general. 
When the short rate is at the ZLB, however, the spreads cannot become negativ. 
24  Some use the ZIRP to mean only a zero policy rate. Here it refers to the combination of a zero 
rate and the commitment to maintain it until deflation ends.   12 
 
rate to the current account balances (CAB) at the BOJ, essentially, bank reserves. This 
framework was promised to be maintained until CPI inflation became stably positive 
(forward  guidance).  And,  the  BOJ  increased  the  amount  of  purchases  of  Japanese 
Government Bonds (JGBs) from time to time to hit the target on the CAB—targeted 
asset purchases. The target on the CABs was increased from approximately 5 trillion 
yen at the introduction of QEJ in March 2001, an amount roughly 1 trillion yen greater 
than  the  then-required  reserves,  to  a  range  of  approximately  30-35  trillion  yen  in 
January 2004. QEJ was finally lifted in March 2006. The extent of the BOJ’s balance 
sheet  expansion  was  unprecedented  at  that  time  and  is  comparable  to  that  of  other 
central banks during the late 2000s. 
Third, in response to negative spillover effects on the Japanese economy of the 
world  financial crisis  of 2007-09 the BOJ  again resorted to  many non-conventional 
measures. Thus, it started term fund supplying operations at 3 months at a fixed rate of 
0.1%  in  December  2009,  later  extended  to  6  months.  Since  October  2010,  it  has 
introduced the Comprehensive Monetary Easing Policy (CMP), the BOJ’s version of 
targeted asset purchases, to buy commercial papers, corporate bonds, ETFs, REITs and 
long-term JGBs. The BOJ has explicitly stated that “the Bank will encourage the decline 
in longer-term interest rates and various risk premiums.” Forward guidance has also 
been used in a slightly weaker form than in the ZIRP or QEJ periods. Since 2007, no 
attempt has been made to target the size of the BOJ’s balance sheet. Throughout the 
three phases, credit easing measures have been extensively employed to contain stresses 
in the financial system.     
A few remarks on the non-conventional measures adopted by other central banks 
since  2007  are  in  order.  Reflecting  the  severity  of  the  credit/liquidity  crunch,  most 
central banks adopted credit easing measures that fit the characteristics of the stresses in 
the country. For example, the Fed lent to brokers and MMFs; the ECB bought covered 
bonds. No central bank has created a target on a measure of the liability side of its 
balance sheet, while most central banks have adopted targeted asset purchases whereby 
a specified set of assets has been bought up to pre-determined amounts. The forward 
guidance approach has been used by the Fed and the Bank of Canada, but in a much 
weaker  form  than  the  BOJ  during  1999-2006.  These  features  seem  to  reflect  the 
judgment on the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the BOJ in earlier periods, to 
which I now turn. 
 
Evidence on the Effectiveness of the BOJ’s Measures 
     Given Japan’s persistent deflation and sub-par economic growth, one might think   13 
 
that the measures adopted by the BOJ have had no effects on the economy. This is 
certainly  not  the  case.  Among  other  things,  various  credit  easing  measures  have 
contained risk premiums  and prevented the financial system  from falling  apart.  For 
example, Baba, Nakashima, Shigemi and Ueda (2006) and BOJ (2009) find that the 
BOJ’s fund supplying operations reduced money market risk premiums almost to zero. 
This can be seen informally in Figure 5 where the money market risk premium has been 
kept at very low levels with only two exceptions, one, during Japan’s credit crunch 
(1997-98, i.e., T=7,8) and, the other, right after the Lehman shock (T=18, 19). 
     More formally, Table 2 presents the response of asset prices to some of the major 
policy  measures  adopted  by  the  BOJ  during  the  two  day  window  following  the 
announcement of the measures.
25  In the table, the measures are classified into three 
types, A (forward guidance), B (targeted asset purchases) and C (pure QE), according to 
the typology offered above.  Entries in columns 3 to 5 show the number of times the 
measures moved the asset price in the expected direction. The results indicate that many 
of the measures lowered the 10 year JGB yield, with some also raising Nikkei 225. One 
puzzle is that  they did not have strong effects on the yen/dollar rate.
26  Perhaps, the 
market realized that the BOJ was closer to the limit of non -conventional monetary 
policy than were other central banks. Another characteristic of the table is that strategy 
C, mere expansion of the BOJ ’s balance sheet, seems less effective than the others, 
conforming to the theoretical prediction offered above.   
Intuitively, the difficulty with finding significant effects of strategy C may be 
appreciated from the failure of huge expansions in the balance sheet of major central 
banks to stimulate their economies in any significant ways.
27  The BOJ had the largest 
balance sheet  in the late 1990s to m id-2000s, but failed to stimulate the economy 
adequately. The BOJ’s exit from QEJ created a sharp fall in its balance sheet, but the 
economy kept expanding at a moderate rate. None of the balance sheet expansion by 
four major central banks since 2007 have generated as large an effect on output and 
prices as the size of the expansion suggests. 
Analyses employing more sophisticated methods also find significant effects of 
strategies  A(forward  guidance)  and/or  B(targeted  asset  purchases).
28  Not too many, 
                                                   
25  Such an analysis is motivated by the prevalence of a similar approach, the news 
analysis, to evaluate the measures adopted by the Fed. See Ueda (2012). 
26  One important exception, not included in the table, is large scale foreign exchange 
market interventions carried out by Japan’s Ministry of Finance during 2003-04. These 
were effectively an example of targeted asset purchases. 
27  Figure A4 shows the size of central bank balance sheet relative to GDP for the Euro Area, Japan, 
the U.K. and the U.S. 
28  See, for example, Okina & Shiratsuka (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack (2004),   14 
 
however, have found significant effects of Strategy C (pure expansion of central bank 
balance sheet).
29  To summarize, the effects of the BOJ ’s non-conventional monetary 
policy measures have been non-negligible. Liquidity provision stabilized the financial 
system and forward guidance and/or targeted asset purchases lowered a range of interest 
rates and supported the economy. This may be the major reason for the absence of 
acceleration  in  deflation.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  measures  have  fallen  short  of 
bringing inflation back into positive territory clearly. 
     Figure 8 shows all this in a slightly different manner. Movements in the JGB yield 
curve since the beginning of 1999 are plotted. It can be seen that the introduction of the 
ZIRP in April 1999 shifted the curve downward, and QEJ, implemented in 2001, shifted 
it further downward. Clearly, the two measures exerted more long-lasting effects on 
interest rates than for just two days as was the case in Table 2. These, however, failed to 
affect  medium-term  growth  and/or  inflation  expectations  positively;  hence,  the 
downward shifts of the entire curve rather than those of a left portion of the curve 
only.
30  As argued above, the forward guidance strateg y, if successful, would  lower 
expected future short rates up to a certain point in the future, but raise them beyond that. 
The second part did not materialize.  One exception was a brief period following the 
introduction of QEJ. As shown in Figure 8, the 10 year JGB rate declined sharply on the 
day of the introduction of QEJ.   Starting on the next day, however, the rate moved 
upward and this continued for about a month. Stock prices also moved upward for one 
and a half months, both seem to have been a favorable response to QEJ. Such responses, 
however, soon gave way to weakness in the economy and asset prices came back to 
pre-QEJ levels.
31  The effects on expectations were only temporary. This seems to have 
been a result of the adoption of the move after expectations of low/negative inflation 
became entrenched.   
     The  forward  guidance  strategy  is  more  useful  if  it  is  introduced  when 
                                                                                                                                                     
Baba et al. (2006) and Oda & Ueda (2007). 
29  One exception is Honda, Kuroki & Tachibana (2007) who find, using VAR analysis, 
that an expansion of the CAB exerted significant effects on stock prices and in turn on 
output. Given the methodology, however, it is unclear which aspect of QEJ generated 
such effects. The analysis also does not include a variable representing changes in 
perceptions about the stability of the financial system and hence runs the risk of picking 
up spurious correlation between money and output. 
30  The picture does not change if implied forward interest rates are used in place of 
long-term rates. For example, 10 year forward 10 year has been stable at around 3% 
since 1998. There is a weak negative trend in 10 year forward 20 year in the 2000s. 
31  It is interesting to note that the response of interest rates and stock prices in the U.S. 
to the Fed’s QE2 during 2010-2011 was very similar to Figure 8, although the period of 
favorable response was longer.   15 
 
expectations exist that the economy will be out of the liquidity trap before long. Then, 
the promise of “unnecessary monetary easing” after the economy is out of the trap 
affects current inflation expectations more. Unfortunately, strategy A was first used in 
1999 when inflation was already negative. QEJ came in 2001, after more than three 
years of deflation.     
     Faced with the difficulty of affecting expectations on a sustained basis, the BOJ 
has had to reduce risk premiums and long-short interest rate spreads in many parts of 
the financial system, increasingly hitting the “lower bounds on spreads”. Figure 7 shows 
that as of September 2011 the yield curve has virtually no room downward to the left of 
the 5 year maturity. Even the 30 year rate is below 2%. While the precise magnitude of 
the room left for these rates to decline is difficult to determine, one cannot escape the 
impression that they are close to lower bounds. To repeat, they are as low as these levels 
because of the protracted stagnation in the economy and repeated application of non- 
conventional monetary policy measures. As rates and spreads come close to their lower 
bounds, they have started to  affect  the incentive of private financial institutions  for 
financial  intermediation  negatively.  Rates  having  been  low  for  such  a  long  time, 
borrowers of funds are in no hurry to take advantage of low rates. Thus, the economy 
has been stuck in a low inflation, low interest rate equilibrium. 
     The lesson here is that central banks are advised to use even non-conventional 
monetary  policy  measures  before  deflationary  expectations  become  entrenched. 
Otherwise, expectations of deflation and low growth can significantly undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures. A case in point is the spillover of developed market 
monetary  easing  during  2009-2011,  especially  the  Fed’s  non-conventional  monetary 
easing, into emerging market economies and commodity markets where deleveraging 
forces were very weak. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
     This paper has analyzed Japan’s economic stagnation during the last two decades 
and the BOJ’s failure to turn it around. The stagnation originated in the deleveraging 
process after the burst of Japan’s asset price bubble. The unprecedented extent of the 
excesses during the boom led to the severity of deleveraging. The process, however, has 
become more protracted due to the failure of monetary authorities to act at early stages. 
The government should have re-capitalized banks in the early to mid-1990s. Some of 
the BOJ’s rate increases in the early 1990s may have been unnecessary, and rate cuts in 
the early to mid-1990s  could have been more aggressive. As a result, the economy 
experienced a severe financial crisis in 1997-98 and a negative feedback loop developed   16 
 
among asset prices, financial stability and growth. Deflation, if mild, ensued in response 
and constrained the BOJ’s ability to stimulate the economy through conventional and 
non-conventional monetary policy measures. 
     In contrast, the U.S. monetary authorities reacted promptly to developments since 
2007. The Fed lowered the Federal Funds rate to virtually zero within one and a half 
years  of  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  and  has  adopted  various  non-conventional 
monetary policy measures as well. U.S. banks were re-capitalized in late 2008. Thanks 
to these, the financial system has resumed stability to a certain extent and inflation has 
stayed in positive territory. 
     It has to be noted, however, that the prompt responses of the U.S. authorities 
owed much to the market based nature of the U.S. financial system and the immediate 
manifestation of financial stresses after the burst of the property and credit bubble as 
well as to their learning from the Japanese experience. 
     The U.S. economy, however, is still far from having recovered  fully from the 
financial  and  economic  crisis  of  2007-09.  Households  are  still  deleveraging  and 
property prices seem to be at critical levels. Figure 1 shows that U.S. property prices 
relative to the previous peak are now roughly at levels where Japanese land prices were 
in  the  mid-  to  late  1990s,  just  when  the  negative  feedback  loop  became  more 
significant.
32   
     Judging from Figure  7, traction left of the Fed ’s  non-conventional  monetary 
policy seems roughly equal to that of the BOJ in the late 1990s as far as the government 
bond market is concerned, while there is probably some more room for action elsewhere, 
for example, in the RMB market. This may or may not be enough to counteract possible 
negative  forces  coming  from  further  deleveraging  or  other  external  shocks  such  as 
instability in the Euro area.   
One lesson from the Japanese experience is that the Fed should not worry too 
much about inflation when using the remaining traction of non-conventional measures. 
Take the forward guidance approach as an example.  As stated earlier, the approach 
stimulates the economy by promising to keep interest rates low even after the economy 
recovers significantly. This necessarily means that either the central bank has raised the 
inflation target or is ready to allow the inflation rate to overshoot the target temporarily. 
The central bank is thus accepting some inflation risk in return for lowering deflation 
risk. Hence, central banks’ usual concerns for inflation could become a deterrent to the 
effective functioning of such a strategy. Acting along these lines is difficult for the Fed, 
given the still high levels of inflation. Sometimes, however, decision has to be made 
                                                   
32  See also Figure A1.   17 
 
about what risk one wants to minimize. The BOJ’s behavior in this respect was rather 
halfhearted. It introduced a forward guidance approach in early 1999, promising that a 
zero rate would be kept until deflationary concerns were dispelled, which should have 
meant  targeting  a positive inflation rate.  It  exited from  the  framework, however, in 
August  2000  when  core  inflation  was  -0.5%.  Deliberations  within  the  BOJ  on  the 
“meaning of price stability” later that year were not able to determine whether price 
stability meant a zero inflation or a positive inflation.
33  Such confusion seems to have 




   
                                                   
33  See BOJ (2000). 
34  The BOJ exited from QEJ in March 2006 with a core CPI inflation rate of -0.5% 
despite the promise of the continuation of QEJ until “inflation is stably positive.” This is 
partially explained by the possibility that the BOJ had attached more importance to 
headline inflation than its core. But headline inflation was -0.3% in August 2000 and 
0.1% in March 2006. (In Japan headline inflation means e- energy and core, 
ex-energy-food.) The BOJ later defined price stability more explicitly to mean 0% to 2% 
with 1% being the preferred level for many board members.   18 
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Table 1    Financial Assets/Liabilities of Financial Intermediaries
                 in 2001: % in total
Japan US Euro Area
Depository Corporations 59 25 60
Insurance and Pension Funds 18 28 13
Others 23 47 27
Source: Flow of Funds: The Bank of Japan
Table 2 The effects of the BOJ's non-conventional measures
            on asset prices
Type of measure # of times adopted Nikkei 225 10 yr JGB Yen/Dollar
A 2 2 1 1
A,B,C 1 1 1 1
B,C 4 3 4 1
C 4 2 1 1
B 6 3 5 3
Notes: 1, The entries in the third to fifth columns are the number of times in
    which the measures moved the asset price in the expected direction during
   the two days following the policy change.
  2, In the first column, A: forward guidance, B: targeted asset purchases,
   C: pure expansion of the BOJ's balance sheet.
  3, The specific dates for the measure adopted are: the first row, 13/4/99,
   18/12/09, the second row, 19/03/01, the thrid row, 14/08/01, 19/12/01,
   28/02/02, 30/10/02, the fourth row, 30/04/03, 20/05/03, 10/10/03,
   20/01/04, the fifth row, 19/12/08, 18/03/09, 05/10/10, 14/03/11, 04/08/11,
   27/10/11.
  4, The easing on 19/12/08 included a policy rate cut.
Data Source: Bloomberg  21 
 
Note: T=0 corresponds to 1990 for Japan and 2001 for the U.S. 
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Figure 2 Per capita RGDP and Population 
Growth Rates in Japan & the U.S. 
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Figure 4 Bank Loan Growth Rates in Japan & 
the U.S., 
and Bad Loan Disposals in Japan  
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Notes: 1, The risk premium is 3 month LIBOR- 3 month Treasury bill rate for the U.S. 
and 60-90 day bank certificate of deposits – 3 month treasury bill rate for Japan. 




















































Figure 5 Money Market Risk Premium  
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Figure 6 Real & Nominal Overnight Rates in 
Japan and the U.S. 
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Notes: 1, Inflation expectations are calculated as implied forward interest rates from 
the SWAP curve – growth expectations in Cabinet Office’s survey. 
2, 5YR 5YR uses 5 yr forward rates starting in the fifth year. 5YR 10YR uses 5 yr 
forward rates starting in the 10th year. Growth expectations are for the next 5 years and 
are assumed to be constant over the 12 months within each year. 














Figure A2 Inflation Expectations in Japan 
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Figure A4 Central Bank Balance Sheets/ GDP 
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